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ABSENCE OF CONSIDERATION
IN 'THE LAW-OF BILLS AND NOTES
BENJAMIN GEVA *
I
By the latter part of the sixteenth century the theory of liability on
bills of exchange had been adapted to common law theory of con-
tract so as to lie in assumpsit.' In 1787 it was fully settled by the
House of Lords that all "contracts in writing ... [which are] merely
written and not specialties . ..are parol" and require considera-
tion. 2 Promissory notes and bills of exchange fell into this category.3
Indeed, "bills and notes were contracts and being such there was
no persuasive reason why the basis of liability on a bill or note should
be any different from that on any other written contract for pay-
ment of money."' While there is no provision in the Bills of
Exchange Act (" the Act ") directly to the point,6 it is well estab-
lished indeed that consideration of "value" ' is needed for the
creation of an obligation under a negotiable instrument. According
to Chalmers, "where B, by way of gift, makes a note in favour of C,
C cannot recover from B." I
It seems to follow that a holder not in due course takes the
LL.B., Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1970; LL.M., Harvard Law School,
1975; Visiting Lecturer in Law, The University of Chicago, 1976-77; Associate
Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, Toronto.
I See general: T. A. Street, The Foundations of Legal Liability (1906) Vol. If,
p. 343.
2 Rann v. Hughes (1787) 7 T.R. 350 n. (a); 101 E.R. 1014 n. (a).
3 Street, supra note 1, at p. 389. For a short historical account as to the necessity
of consideration in the law of bills and notes, see W. E. Britton, Handbook on the
Law of Bills and Notes (1961), pp. 211 et seq.
4 Britton, ibid., p. 213.
5 U.K. 1882, 45 & 46 Vict. c. 61 ; Can.: R.S.C. 1970, c. B-5. For a list of juris-
dictions which have adopted a statute modelled on the Act, see: Falconbridge,
On Banking and Bills of Exchange, 7th ed. (1969), by Rogers, pp. 431-432.
6 Cf. U.K., ss. 27-28; Can., ss. 53-55.
7 " Value" means " valuable consideration "; U.K., s. 2; Can.. s. 2. " Valuable
consideration . .. may be constituted by . . . any consideration sufficient to sup-
port a simple contract [or] an antecedent debt or, liability "; U.K., s. 27 (1);
Can., s. 53 (1), emphasis added.
8 For a general discussion on the subject with a specific application to jurisdictions
where the common law consideration is not required for the formation of a
contract (Quebec, Louisiana, Scotland and Israel) see: Barak. " The Require-
ment of Consideration for Bills and Notes in Israel" (1967), 2 Is.L.Rev. 499.
Note that consideration under the Act includes "past consideration " (U.K., s. 27
(1) (b); Can., s. 53 (1) (b) and as such is broader than the common law con-
sideration; cf. in general: Wickhem, " Consideration and Value in Negotiable
Instruments" (1926), 3 Wis.L.Rev. 321, 323--324.
Chalmers, On Bills of Exchange, 13th ed., by Smout (1964), p. 102 and n. 16
digesting Holliday v. Atkinson (1826) 5 B. & C. 501; 108 E.R. 187.
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instrument subject to the defence of original absence of consideration.
-Indeed, "a bill or note .. is both a chattel and a chose in action."
Its ownership "involves not only the right to possess a thing but the
right to sue. .. " 10 Corresponding "to the duplex nature of the
negotiable instrument," equities affecting it "must [thus] be classi-
fied. .. as they relate to... ownership of the chattel or to liability on
[the] obligation." '" Equities affecting the right to sue and recover
on the obligation, side by side with those affecting the right to possess
the piece of paper, consitute defects of title 12 to which a holder not
in due course is subject.1"
Consistent with this analysis, the American Uniform Com-
mercial Code follows its predecessor the Uniform Negotiable Instru-
ments Law and explicity provides that " [w]ant. . . of consideration
is a defense as against any person not having the rights of a holder in
due course." " Against the absence of a corresponding provision in
the Anglo-Canadian Act, Falconbridge concludes however that
" [o]riginal absence of consideration is not a defect of title or equity
attaching to the instrument." 11 He bases his view on pre-Act cases 1
as well as on the fact that "absence of consideration is not one of the
defects of title specified in [the Act]." 1 He adds that " [t]he general
principle, that absence of consideration is not a defect of title,
seems to be implied in s. 54 18 which defines a holder for value."
His summary is in line with Chalmers." "Original absence of con-
sideration . is a matter of defence against an immediate party, or
a remote party 2" who is not a holder for value, but it is not a
l Chafee, "Rights in Overdue Paper" (1918) 31 Harv.L.Rev. 1104, 1109. The
"right to sue " in this context is the power to enforce the obligation rather than
the standing to bring the action.
11 Ibid., p. 1110.
12 Equities affecting the instrument or " attaching to the bill " are interchangeable
with defects of title": Chalmers, supra, note 9, p. 122; Falconbridge, supra,
note 5, pp. 654, 667 and 670; Alcock v. Smith (1892) 1 Ch. 238, 263.
13 The subjection of a holder not in due course to defects of title is supported
by the Act (U.K., ss. 36 (2) and 36 (5), Can., ss. 70 (1) and 72) and agreed among
text book writes: Falconbridge, supra, note 5, p. 666; Byles, On Bills of Exchange
23rd ed., by Megrah and Ryder (1972), p. 195, (but cf. p. 190); Cowen, On the
Law of Negotiable Instruments in South Africa 4th ed., by Cowen and Gering
(1966), p. 274.
14 U.C.C. § 3-408. The prior provision of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law
(N.I.L.) is s. 28, see note 63 and text, infra.
15 Falconbridge, supra, note 5, p. 619. See also: Byles, supra, note 13 p. 222, and
note 36.
16 Charles v. Marsden (1808) 1 Taunt. 224; 127 E.R. 818; Sturtevant V. Ford (1842)
4 Man. & G. 101; 134 E.R. 42; Lazarus V. Cowie (1843) 3 Q.B. 459; 114 E.R.
583.
17 Supra, note 15. The list in U.K., s. 29 (2) and Can., s. 56 (2) includes fraud,
duress, force and fear, illegality and breach of faith.
is Can., s. 54 is U.K.'s 27 (2) (3). The relevant part is U.K.'s s. 27 (2) set forth
in tex subsequent to note 37, infra.
19 Chalmers, supra, note 9, p. 102.
20, Parties are " immediate" or " remote" in relation to their own dealings under-
lying the instrument. In a promissory note issued by a buyer to the order of a
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defence *against [a remote party who is] a holder for value."21
"Holder for value" is a holder who either himself took the instru-
ment for *value, or who derives his title from one who had given
value, for it.22 He does not have to be a holder in due course.23
This summary reflects the prevailing view on the availability of
-absence of consideration as a defence to an action on a bill or note.24
.The present article challenges this summary by critically examining
and refuting its grounds. It presents the proposition that absence of
consideration tb a promise on a bill 5 or note is an equity as to the
liability of the promisor, which under the Anglo-Canadian Act
is available to him as a defence against every holder not in due course.
While there is no direct authority supporting it, it will be argued that
unlike Falconbridge's summary, this proposition is consistent with
general principles of law as well as with the scheme of the Act. Thus,
pursuing Chalmers's example,26 when C negotiates the note (made in
his favour by B by way of gift) to D, D's power to recover from B
depends on whether he (D) is a holder in due course. Otherwise,
having a title to a piece of paper and to an unenforceable promise,
D is under the same disability as C. The power of a subsequent
holder E (D's indorsee) to recover from B depends on whether he
himself (E) is a holder in due course,, or alternatively on whether
he "derives title to [the note] through a holder in due course [i.e.,
D], and . . . is not himself a party to any fraud or illegality
affecting it." 27 The holding in due course requirement could be
waived only when value is given before the promisor's (B's) death
for "an actual dealing for value with a note would complete the
gift as a valid donatio morris causa" so as to entitle the holder
(even if not in due course) to payment out of B's estate. 2
seller of goods and subsequently discounted with a finance company, the maker-
buyer and the payee-seller are immediate parties, the maker-buyer and the
indorsee-finance company are remote parties, and the payee-seller and the
indorsee-finance company are immediate parities.
21 Supra, note 15.
22 Cf. Barclays Bank Ltd. v. Astley Industrial Trust Ltd. [1970] 2 Q.B. 527, 538-539
per Milmo J.
2.1 A holder in due course holds the instrument " free from any defect of title
of prior parties ...": U.K., s. 38 (2); Can., s. 74 (b).
24 See also: Jacobs, On Bills of Exchange, Cheques, Promissory Notes, etc., 2nd ed.
(1924) pp. 57, 106; Cowen, supra, note 13, p. 247-248; Byles, supra, note 13,
p. 191; B. B. Riley, Bills of Exchange in Australia 3rd ed., by Chappenden and
Bilinsky (1976), p. 87.
25 Unlike a promissory note (U.K., s. 176 (1);: Can., s. 83 (1)) a bill of exchange
is an "order" rather than "promise" (U.K., s. 3 (1); Can., s. 17 (1)). None-
theless, the liability of the drawer is on his own promise to pay: U.K., s. 55
(1) (a); Can., s. 130 (a).
26 Supra, note 9 and text.
27 U.K., s. 29 (3), Can., s. 57.
21 Rolls v. Pearce (1877) 5 Ch.D. 730, 734. See note 50, infra. Query whether this
exception does not depend on the promisor's liability not being contested by the
: executors of his will.
Absence of Consideration
Falconbridge's reliance on the enumeration of the defects of title
in the Act " goes contrary to the accepted view that the examples
given by the Act "do not exhaust the category." " As to pre-Act
leading cases " establishing that "absence of consideration is not a
defect of title or equity attaching to the instrument," 32 Falconbridge
himself acknowledges 11 that all involved an accommodation party."4
They stand for the modest proposition presently provided for by the
Act,3" that an accommodation party, as a surety to the obligor, is
liable to a holder for value notwithstanding the fact that the con-
sideration under the underlying transaction was not given to him
(the accommodation party) but to the person accommodated. This
however is consistent with the surety's position under general prin-
ciples of law," and is not a case of "absence of consideration," as
consideration in the common law has to move from the promisee,
but not necessarily to the promisor.37 In fact, under the pre-Act
cases relied upon by Falconbridge, 28 what could have been an equity
attaching to the accommodation bill is in reality "an agreement not
to negotiate it after it became due." 11 This, as well as the liability of
an accommodation party, is absolutely irrelevant to the proposition
that absence of value is or is not a defect of title.
This leaves us with "s. 54 which defines a holder for value." 40
In its relevant part the section provides that " [w]here value has
at any time, been given for a bill, the holder is deemed to be a holder
for value as regards . . . all parties . . . who become parties prior to
[the giving of the value]" (hereafter: the "holder for value" pro-
29 See note 17 and text, supra.
30 Cowen, supra, note 13, p. 270. See also: Riley; supra, note 24, p. 93; Byles,
supra, note 13, p. 193. Cf. Chalmers, supra, note 9, p. 98; Falconbridge, supra,
note 5, p. 672. The list in U.K., s. 29 (2) and Can., s. 56 (2) (sote 17, supra) is
preceded by " In particular
31 Cited in note 16, supra.
32 See note 15 and text, supra.
33 Falconbridge, supra, note 5, p. 619.
34 An accommodation party is a party to an instrument who has signed it "with-
out receiving value therefor and for the purpose of lending his name to some
other person": U.K., s. 28 (1); Can., s. 55 (1). He is thus not a party to the
underlying contract but a surety of the obligor thereon.
35 U.K., s. 28 (2): Can., s. 55 (2).
36 In general for the consideration requirement in guarantees, see L. A. Sheridan,
Rights in Security (1974), p. 289.
37 See generally Anson's Law of Contract 24th ed., by Guest (1975), p. 97.
3b Cited is note 16, supra.
39 Charles v. Marsden, supra, note 16, p. 225 per Mansfield C.J.; see also p. 226 per
Lawrence J.; Sturtevant v. Ford, supra, note 16, p. 106 per. Cresswell J. Cf.
" Equities Attaching to Overdue Bills of Exchange" (1870) 49 L.T. 122: Indeed,
an agreement governing a bill constitutes an equity thereto: Holmes v. Kidd
(1858) 3 H. & N. 891, 894; 157 E.R. 729.
40 See notes 18-21, supra, Can., s. 54 is U.K., s. 27 (2).
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vision). Nonetheless, this is an ambiguous provision.41 While extend-
ing the concept of "holder for value" to cover also a holder who
is subsequent in the chain of title to the giving of value, the provision
neither defines "holder for value" nor specifies his rights and
powers. As such the provision is potentially susceptible to alterna-
tive interpretations. Thus, in one context in the Act, "holder for
value" denotes the fulfilment of the value requirement as one of
the qualifications of a holder in due course.42 The "holder for
value" provision could therefore mean that a holder who himself
gave no value but derives his title from one who did give value
is to be considered as one who "took the bill . . . for value "'
for the purpose of holding in due course.44 As it is well established
that only a holder who himself gave value can qualify as a holder
in due course, this interpretation should be rejected.4 5 Indeed,
"it seems . impossible to argue . . . that . . . a holder for value
within the meaning of [the provision]-,-which does not require that
he himself should have given value-... [has] an indefeasible right
on the [instrument]." "
Alternatively, there are those who construe the "holder for
value" provision to mean that a holder of an instrument who either
takes it for value or derives his title from one who took it for
value, overcomes the defence of absence of consideration on a
promise of a prior party.47 As a "holder for value" is not required
by the provision to be a holder in due course, the effect of this
construction seems indeed to establish " [t]he general principle that
absence of consideration is not a defect of title." 's This construction
is nonetheless inconsistent with viewing "the benefits of negotiability
. . . applied exclusively in favour of a bona fide transferee for
value." 49 It is further unsupported by authorities.5" Indeed, it was
41 CI. Hunter, "Holders for Value of Negotiable Paper" (1928) 22 Ill.L.Rev. 287.
The reason for its inclusion in the Act "is not altogether obvious "; Byles,
supra, note 13, p. 190.
42 U.K., s. 27 (3); Can., s. 54 (2): " a holder for value to the extent of the sum
for which he has a lien." See also:, U.K., s. 29 (3); Can., s. 57.
43 U.K., s. 29 (1) (b); Can., s. 56 (1) (b).
44 Cf. Hunter, supra, note 41, pp. 290, 295.
45 Indeed, the draftsmen of the U.C.C. considered the " holder for value" provision
"as erroneous and misleading, since a holder who does not himself give value
cannot qualify as a holder is due course . . . merely because value has pre-
viously been given for the instrument'.'; UCC § 3-303, Comment 1.
46 Megrah, letter to the editors, reproduced in Note, " Diamond v. Graham, The
Doctrine of Consideration and Value for a Cheque " (1969) 15 McGill L.J.
487, 492.
47 See, e.g., Thornely, "Consideration for Negotiable Instruments" [1968] C.L.J.
..196. 4 See note 18 and text, supra.
49 Cowen, supra, note 13, p. 271. " Negotiability" in the phrase denotes the
" transfer free from equities," as distinguished from " the simplicity of transfer
Cowen, ibid., p. 3 et seq.
50 But cf. Rolls v. Pearce (1877) 5 Ch.D. 730 the holding in due course require-
ment is waived where value given prior to the promisor's death completes the
[1980]
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stated in Collins v. Martin that "no evidence of want of considera-
tion or other ground to impeach .the apparent value received, was
ever admitted in a case between .. .an acceptor or drawer,, and
a third person holding the bill for value." "' It is however submitted
here, that the reference to the "third person holding the bill for
value" was actually directed at the "bona fide holder for value." '.
First, there is later in the decision, a reference to the power of such
a holder to enforce payment "against good faith and conscience." "
This is compatible only with reading "good faith" into the definition
of the "holder for value." Secondly, besides "want of considera-
tion," the phrase covers any "other ground to impeach the apparent
value received." 14 It is inconceivable that the phrase confers on
a holder for value though not in due course the power to overcome
every "other ground," for this would put him in the same position
of a holder in due course. Thirdly, there are other instances where
courts inaccurately used the terms "indorsee for value," 15 holder
for value or " remote party '' as interchangeable with " holder
in due course." 58 On final account, Collins v. Martin cannot sup-
gift " as a valid donatio mortis causa'" see note 28 and text, supra. There is
nothing in the case to suggest its application to either gifts inter vivos or perhaps
even to a donee mortis cause who first deals with the instrument for value alter
the promisor's (donor's) death. The narrow scope of the decision is reinforced
by the fact that Malins V.-C. decided the case primarily on the basis of his
desire " to do all [he could] to make the gift good " ibid., p. 733. The executors
of the donor's will did not " argue the point adversely to the (donee] " but "only
[wished] to see that the case is fairly presented"; ibid., p. 732.
51 (1797) 1 Bos. & Pull. 648, 651; 126 E.R. 1113 per Eyre C.J. emphasis added.
It was held there on the basis of this proposition that one who indorsed bills in
blank and handed them to his banker for collection and credit to his account,
could not recover the bills from a bona fide pledgee who had lent money to the
banker (who had later failed) against the bills. The similarity between the
proposition and the case is questionable; in the principal-agent for collection
situation (unlike in a donor-donee case), besides want of consideration there is
absence of intention to convey anything to the agent (If the customer's account
has been credited but not withdrawn-the case anyway involves the failure of
consideration by the failure of banker rather than absence of consideration).
The pledgee in Collins v. Martin was bona fide, ibid., p. 648. Even if taken at
face value, the case is therefore hardly persuasive as to the rights of the holder
for value. The court used this peculiar analogy to reach the result in favour of
the pledgee as under contemporary law, since Paterson v. Tash (1743) 2 Strang6
1178; 93 E.R. 1110, a pledgee of goods from a factor exceeding his authority
was defeated by the principal, ibid., p. 651. The latter law has eventually been
reversed by the first Factors Act, 4 Geo. IV, c. 83 (1823).
52 Bona fide holder for value, bona fide holder for value without notice, as well as
bona fide holder of the bill without notice before it is overdue, are all synonyms
substituted in the Act by " holder in due course"; cf. Chalmers, supra, note 9,
p. 94.
53 (1797) I Bos. & Pull. 648, 651; 126 E.R, 1113.
54 See note 51 and text, supra.
,55 Robins v. Reynolds'(1841) 2 Q.B. 196, 211; 114 E.R. 76.
5 Thiedemann v. Goldsmith (1859) 1 De G.F. & J. 4, 12; 45 E.R. 260 per Lord
Justice Knight Bruce. The Lord Chancellor properly referred to the indorsee as
"a holder bona fide for value "; ibid., 10, emphasis in the original.
57 Ashley Colter Ltd. v. Scott [1942] 3 D.L.R. 538,'541 (Can. S.C.).
18 As to the inaccurate nature of this terminology, see notes 22-23 and text, supia.
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port the power of a holder for value to' overcome the defence of
absence of original consideration.
An argument that absence of consideration is not an equity as
to liability cannot rest on the language of the "holder for value"
provision. Indeed, as by its own terms it is inapplicable to the
relations between immediate parties,"5 the provision is consistent
with pre-Act case law under which absence of consideration con-
stitutes an equity as to the liability of an immediate party."0 While
under the provision remote parties are liable towards a holder for
value, there is nothing to suggest therein that this liability depends
on one's signature alone and is irrespective of the absence of con-
sideration. Indeed, reading the "holder for value" provision as
meaning that absence of consideration is not a defence to the
liability of a remote party whose promisee gave no consideration,
is often explained on the basis that "the party who first parts with
consideration is deemed to have done so in reliance upon the
promises of all the parties whose names appear on the instrument." "
Yet if it is the reliance on the appearance of the instrument which
counts, it is hard to see why it is only the defence of absence of
consideration and not any other defence to liability which is over-
come. It is further hard to see how this explanation is provided in
the context of one who is not only not a holder in due course but
may well have actual knowledge of the absence of consideration.
The argument that absence of consideration is not a defence as
to the liability can be made only by analogy to the language of the
section dealing with an accommodation party which speaks of the
latter's liability to a holder for value in absolute terms. 2 None-
theless, this kind of language is characteristic to the whole legislative
technique of the Act. Though the engagement of each party to an
instrument, whether the acceptor, drawer or endorser is defined as
absolute and unrelated to the holder's title, 63 the right to enforce full
payment on an instrument over equities affecting it depends on the
plaintiff's status as a holder in due course." Not reading this
dependence as to the entitlement of the "holder for value," would
confer on him the power to overcome any defence as to liability and
59 See text that follows and note 40, supra.
60 Holliday V. Atkinson (1826) 5 B. & C. 511; 108 E.R. 187 (payee v. maker);
Easton v. Pratchett (1835) 1 C.M. & R. '798, 808; 149 E.R. 1302 (indorsee v.
indorser).
61 Britton, supra, note 3, p. 234. Query whether this explanation was not provided
by Professor Britton only in the context of the liability of an accommodation
party.
62 U.K., s. 28 (2); Can., s. 55 (2): " An accommodation party is liable on the bill
to a holder for value ....
02 U.K., ss. 53-58; Can., ss. 127-138.
64 U.K., s. 38 (2); Can., s. 74 (b).
[1980]
Absence of Consideration
.not only on absence of consideration 65 as if he were a holder in due
course. This indeed is untenable."
Finally, it is ioteworthy that also the American Uniform Nego-
tiable Instruments Law " contained a " holder for value "provision 68
side by side with a section establishing the liability of an accom-
modati'on party towards a holder for value." Both provisions were
modelled on their counterparts in the Act. and used language virtually
identical to them. The American statute contained however a third
section. providing that absence of consideration "is a matter of
defence against any person not a holder in due course." 1o Hence
this reflects, that it would be totally incompatible to construe the
"holder for value" provision as establishing that absence of con-
sideration is not an equity as to the liability of a remote as well as
an immediate party.
It is submitted here, that in its true sense the "holder for'value"
provision means that absence of consideration is not an equity as to
ownership. The provision does not deal with' absence of consideration
as an equity as to liability. Its effect is indeed that only inasmuch as
a holder seeks to establish his property in the instrument rather than
to charge a party with liability, absence of consideration is not a
defect of title."' Thus, as "the outgrowth of the fundamental idea
in the law of negotiable paper ... that a bill or note is a species of
property," the provision means that once "value has ... been given
for the! instrument, it becomes the subject of gift." 72 Accordingly,
" [i]f a party gives to another a negotiable instrument, on which
other parties are liable, the man who makes the gift cannot recover
the bill back, and the man to whom the bill is given may recover
against the other parties on the bill." 11 As such the "holder for
value '' provision is merely a " sheltering" provision 14 which is
complementary to the section conferring on the transferee for value
"such title as the transferor had," '- as well as to another section
giving to " [a] holder . . . who derives his title to a bill through a
holder in due course" the same "rights of that holder in due
66'L Cf. note 61 and text et seq., supra.
66 Cf. note 46 and text, supra.
,'7 The Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law (N.I.L.) is the predecessor of Art. 3
of the U.S. Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.).
68 N.I.L. § 26. The provision was omitted from U.C.C. Article 3. See note 45,
supra. Its effect as a " sheltering provision " (notes 71-76 and text, infra) is
looked after in U.C.C. § 3-201 (1); see note 92, infra.
69 N.I.L. § 29.
-c N.I.L. § 28, emphasis added. Cf. note 14 and text, supra.
71 Cf. notes 10-13 and text,' supra.
72 Britten, supra, note 3, p. 234.
.7 Easton v. Pratchett (1835) 1 C.M. & R. 798, 808; 149 E.R. 1302, 1307, per
Lord Abinger C.B. emphasis added.
74 Note in McGill L.J., supra, note 46, p. 487 and note 2.
7- U.K., s. 31 (4); Can., s. 61 (1).
C.L.J.'
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course."*" Its effect is thus to confer the endorser's title on a holder
who took the instrument without giving value thereto, thereby giving
him a cause of action against prior parties already liable on the instru-
ment. 7 This indeed means that absence of consideration is not an
equity as to ownership of the instrument.7 8 But it falls short from
providing 'that absence of consideration is also not an equity as to
liability on the instrument. In fact, it is submitted, the section does
not even deal with the latter.
This analysis dispells the myth of the "holder for value" as an
intermediate concept who though not a holder in due course over-
comes the defence of absence of consideration. As consideration
given by his promisee is required to charge a promisor with liability
on an instrument, the "holder for value" is in fact the only holder
entitled to recover thereon. Where no promisor is a party to con-
sideration there is neither liability nor a "holder for value." Con-
sideration thus gives rise to liability as well as to the emergence of
a "holder for value."" Yet unless the latter is a holder in due
course, his right is subject to all equities affecting the instrument. As
the nature of the liability on a bill or note is not "different from
that on any other written contract for payment of money," so absence
of consideration to a promise thereon is an equity as to liability. It
is available as a defence to an immediate as Well as remote party
against every holder not in due course.
III
Reading the "holder for value" provision as establishing a special
status of "holder for value" and as such imposing some kind of
absolute liability on an instrument is a source of ongoing confusion."1
Thus, in Diamond v. Graham 82 one H received a cheque from D
76 U.K., s. 29 (3); Can., s. 57.
77 But see Diamond v. Graham [1968] 1 W.L.R. 1061 where the Court of Appeal,
while not articulating any specific theory behind the " holder for value "
provision, understood it to have a wider effect than suggested in this article. The
case is critically examined in Part III infra.
8 By itself the power to sue on the instrument given by U.K., s. 38 (1) (Can.,
s. 74 (a)) to every holder does not necessarily lead to this result, as the section
deals only with standing to sue and is silent as to equities (whether available
or unavailable) against the plaintiff. As a codification of an existing general
principle of law (see note 93 and text, infra) the " holder for value" provision
(as construed in this article) is no more superfluous than, for example, the
provisions cited in notes 75-76 and text, supra.
79 Whether he is the promisee himself or, his transferee even without value, cf.
note 22 and text.
80 See note 4 and text, supra.
81 Queries as to the range of his rights (even beyond his alleged power to overcome
original absence of consideration) were raised by Byles, supra, note 13, p. 190,;
Megrah, stipra, note 46, p. 402; Milmo J.* in Barclays Bank Ltd. v. Astley
Industrial Trust Ltd. [1970] 2 Q.B. 527, 538.
82 [19681 1 W.L.R. 1061; commented on in [1968] C.L.J. 196; (1969) 15 McGill
L.J. 487. 1 ,
Absence of Consideration
signed by D payable to H (" cheque I ") in return for another cheque
drawn by G payable to D, which was delivered to D by H (" cheque
II "). On his part, H gave G his own cheque payable to G
(" cheque III-").'When D sued G on cheque II, G (who had been
unable to collect from H on cheque III), argued that he had received
no consideration from D. Finding that the case "turns upon the con-
struction of. [the 'holder for value' provision]" , a unanimous
Court of Appeal 14 held that D "clearly . . . falls within all the
requirements of the section " 85 and decided in his favour.
, It is submitted here that the "holder for value" provision was
totally irrelevant in resolving this case. In holding that " [t]here is
nothing in the subsectioi which appears to require value to have
been given by the holder as long as value has been given for [cheque
II] " 86 the court stated the obvious but failed to see that this. did
not establish" an indefeasible right [on cheque II]." 87 Moreover, in
the facts of the case D did give value for cheque II by paying H
for it with cheque I. As consideration has to move from the promisee
but not necessarily to the promisor,88 this could have supported D's
entitlement. Yet no direct contractual relationship ever existed
between D and G. The proper analysis of the case is rather that H,
the " remitter" of cheque II, procured its issuance 89 and by paying
for it to G with cheque III became its owner. Thereby he came to be
in position "to confer title to [cheque II] upon the payee." "0 D
himself acquired title to cheque II by purchasing it from H for
value i(paying H for it with cheque I). The point to be decided was
whether D, the payee of cheque II but a purchaser thereof, could
qualify as a holder in due course " so as to overcome the failure of
consideration (the dishonour of cheque III) between G and H. In
determining this issue, the "holder for value" provision is indeed
immaterial. Reading it as establishing a special status of "holder
for value" and as such imposing some kind of absolute liability on
the instrument was indeed a source of confusion.
IV
The "holder for value" provision is one aspect of the general
proposition that any transfer of an instrument, whether by endorse-
.83 [1968] 1 W.L.R. 1061, 1064 per Diplock L.J.
84 Danckwerts, Diplock, and Sachs L.JJ.
85 [1968] 1 W.L.R. 1061, 1065 per Diplock L.J.
86 Ibid., p. 1064 per Danckwerts L.J.
87 Cf. note 46 and text, supra. 88 See note 37 and text, supra.
88 In general for the " remitter " as one who procures the issuance of an instrument
payable to another, see Beutel, " Rights of Remitters and Other Owners not
within the Tenor of Negotiable Instruments" (1928) 12 Minn.L.Rev. 584.
90 Munroe v. Bordier (1849) 8 C.B. 862, 872.
91 Since R. E. jones Ltd. v. Waring and Gillow Ltd. [1926] A.C. 670 (H.L.)'it
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ment or not, whether by a holder or -not, or whether for -value or
without value, vests in the transferee such rights as the transferor
has therein. 2 In the framework of this provision, absence of con-
sideration moving from the promisee of an immediate as well as a
remote party is indeed not an equity attaching to ownership of the
instrument.
Whether the plaintiff holder not in due course is a remote or
immediate party, absence of consideration from the defendant's
promisee is nonetheless an equity as to liability on an instrument.
Thus, only inasmuch as a holder not in due course seeks to establish
his property in the instrument rather than to charge a party with
liability, absence of consideration is not a defect of title. The divided
effect of the defence is the result of the confinement of the con-
sideration requirement in the general law to the enforceability of an
obligation but not to the transfer of property. 5 Though not an equity
as to ownership under property law, absence of consideration is
indeed an equity as to liability under contract law.
would be difficult to hold that an original payee can be a holder in due course
(subject perhaps to the recent qualification which emerges from Jade International
Steel Stahl und Eisen Gmb H and Co. Kg v. Robert Nicholas (Steels) Ltd. [1978]
3 W.L.R. 39 with regard to the payee who reacquires the instrument from a
holder in due course, see Thornely [1978] C.L.J. 236). But see the effective
criticism of this understanding of Jones (in particular as applied to the
remitter ") in Aigler, " Payees as Holders in Due Course " (1927) 36 Yale L.J.
608, 609-619. It is submitted here that in Diamond v. Graham, if D could not
be a holder in due course of cheque II (as a matter of either law or fact), he
should not have been allowed to recover from G.
92 See notes 71-76 and text, supra. Note that such a general proposition is embodied
in U.C.C., § 3-201 (d) : " Transfer of an instrument vests in the transferee such
rights as the transferor has therein .. " This is a considerable improvement
in relation to the piecemeal treatment of the subject in the Act.
13 Cf. in general Stojar,"' A Rationale of Gifts and Favours " (1956) 19 M.L.R. 237.
